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THE WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
THE EFFECT OF THE WAR ON INTERNATIONAL LAW
II. WAR AND NEUTRALITY,-
By QUINCY WRIGHT*
T[HE law of war is founded on a compromise between the
sentiment of humanity and the belligerent object of bring-
ing the enemy to complete submission as soon as possible.' Its
basic principle, which forbids destruction of life and property
of the enemy causing suffering out of proportion to the military
advantage gained,2 dates from ancient times,3 but its detailed
rules, though in many cases originating in the middle ages, 4 have
not been unaffected by ephemeral conditions. The progress of in-
vention, the concentration of national organization, and changes
in the humanitarian sentiment reflected by public opinion, have
continually produced modifications. The la'w of war has been
somewhat less stable than the law of peace, during the past
three centuries, and has perhaps been somewhat more affected by
recent social and scientific inventions, but on the whole the
World War has not shown it seriously out of harmony with
present conditions.
The law of neutrality is based on compromises between more
numerous and more changeable interests than the law of war, and
is more directly dependent upon changing conditions, especially
of transport and communication. Not only is there conflict be-
tween the general interest of neutrals to continue trade uninter-
ruptedly and of belligerents to bring the enemy to complete sub-
*Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Minnesota.
tContinued from 5 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEw 436.
'Lieber's Instructions, U. S. Army, G. 0., 100, 1863, secs. 15, 16;U. S. Rules of Land Warfare, 1914, secs. 10-13; Hall, International Law,7th ed., (Higgins), sec. 17; 2 Westlake, International Law, 2nd ed., 128.2Declaration of St. Petersburg, 1868, Preamble; IV Hague Conven-
tion, 1907, Preamble, annex arts. 22, 23e.3
"Whereas the taking and demolishing an enemy's forts, harbours,
cities, men, ships and crops, and other such things, by which our enemy is
weakened, and our own interests and tactics supported, are necessary actsaccording to the laws and rights of war; to deface temples, statues, and
such like erections in pure wantonness, and without 'any prospect of
strengthening oneself or weakening the enemy, must be regarded as an
act of blind passion and insanity," Polybius, 5: 11. Trans. Shuckburgh,
quoted in Walker, History of the Law of Nations, p. 53.4Especially among the Saracens and Italians, Walker, op. cit. pp. 126,
130, 189.
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mission,5 but there are conflicts between particular interests of
states arising from peculiar geographical position, social organi-
zation or state policy.6 States relying on a navy will want differ-
ent rules of neutrality from states relying on land forces. So
also the interest of states with scattered territory and numerous
ports differs from that of compact and landlocked states. The
same is true of states supplied with ample raw materials in their
territory as opposed to states relying on external trade. Finally,
states with policies creating an expectation of war will approve
different rules of neutrality from those anticipating continuous
peace. Experience has shown that the peculiar interests of the
states which happen to be neutral and belligerent in a given war,
and the ratio of belligerent to neutral potetnjial power has greatly
influenced the interpretation of the law of neutrality in every
war and has often modified the law itself.
7 The law of neutral-
ity has doubtless been more altered by the recent war than has
the law either of peace or war.
Reflection upon 'the recent war is likely to convince one that
fear of jeopardizing military success, whether by inviting repri-
sals, stimulating the enemy to greater exertion, or making neu-
trals enemies, is the only sanction of the laws of war and neu-
trality likely to prevent violations by a belligerent fighting for
national existence. Consequently rules must be framed so that
observance is the best policy from a purely military standpoint
or they will be ignored in a closely contested war. Law may pre-
vent wanton destruction of life and property in war but it cannot
hope to prevent violence which really makes for military success.
8
As has been noticed the rules of war have developed in full
appreciation of this principle.9 Consequently self interest would
seem to sanction their observance by belligerents capable of
looking beyond the immediate military operation to the war as
a whole. Where solemnly accepted by treaty, as is the case with
many of the rules of war, the sanction of good faith fortifies,
though it must be feared somewhat feebly, that of utility. It
would seem that the war experience justifies most of the estab-
lished law of war. Violations seem in fact to have reacted most
disastrously to the violator.10
5Hall, op. cit. secs. 19, 20.
6A. J. Balfour, The Freedom of the Seas, Interview to American
Press, May 1916, printed in Essays Speculative and Political, p. 211, et seq.7Oppenheim, International Law, 3rd ed., p. 94.
8Supra note 1. 9Supra note 2, and Westlake, op. cit. pp. 61, 128.
105 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 444.
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The war has, bowever, shown that international law can not
greatly reduce the destructiveness of war. Rather it has shown
that with the progress of science and national organization the
destructiveness of war is likely to increase to an extent jeopard-
izing the existing civilization." This consideration perhaps
suggests that the effort of international law to regulate war and
neutrality is of slight practical value and that international law
must more seriously devote itself to the regulation of condi-
tions which lead to war and the elimination of war itself. Con-
sequently (1) the right to declare war and (2) the right to re-
main neutral have been considered first in this article. Of the
many topics in the laws of war and neutrality which have been
discussed during the war, two have been selected for considera-
tion because they involve consideration of fundamental princi-
ples which have been drawn in question by the war. These
are (3) the right to attack non-combatants, and (4) the right
to employ novel instruments of war. In all wars there have
been allegations of violations of international law. Such alle-
gations may be met by a denial that the act complained of oc-
curred, by a denial that the principle asserted is law, or by the
contention, admitting the fact and the law, that the departure
from law was justified by exceptional circumstances. The suffi-
ciency of this contention is examined according as the act com-
plained of is (5) in retaliation, (6) at convenience, or (7) under
necessity. In the law of war as of peace the need of more cer-
tain and definite processes for sanctioning the law has been
felt, consequently in conclusion attention has been given to (8)
the responsibility for violations of the law of war.
1. THE RIGHT TO DECLARE WAR
For over a hundred years international law has abandoned
the quest of early publicists for general principles distinguish-
ing between just and unjust wars and the legal right to declare
war has been unlimited unless special treaties intervened.12 Thus
"
1Lecture by Major General Sir Louis Jackson, Dec. 1919, Journ. of
the Royal United Service Institution, 65, No. 457, Feb. 1920, quoted in
H. G. Wells, The Outline of History, 2: 567-571.
'
2
"Grotius devotes several chapters to an attempt to distinguish be-
tween just and unjust causes of war. Such matters as these are supreme-ly important; but they belong to morality and theology, and are as much
out of place in a treatise on International Law as would be a discussion
on the ethics of marriage in a book on the law of personal status." Law-
rence, The Principles of International Law, p. 333. See also Hall, op. cit.
sec. 16; Wilson and Tucker, International Law, 7th ed. p. 236; Davis,
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the commission of the Peace Conference on responsibilities, al-
though holding that "The war was premeditated by the Central
Powers together with their allies, Turkey and Bulgaria, and was
the result of acts deliberately committed in order to make it
unavoidable,"'I3 considered that even "a war of aggression may
not be considered as an act directly contrary to positive law"' 4
and consequently recommended that "The acts which brought
about the war should not be charged against their authors or
made the subject of proceedings before a tribunal."' ' The Treaty
of Versailles, however, does not follow this recommendation,
but indicates a desire to modify the law by establishing a pecu-
niary responsibility on states and a personal liability on govern-
ments for making war without sufficient reason.
By article 231:
"The Allied and Associated Governments affirm, and Germany
accepts, the responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing
all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Gov-
ernments and their nationals have been subjected as a conse-
quence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Ger-
many and her allies."
By article 227 "The Allied and Associated Powers publicly
arraign William II of Hohenzollern, formerly German Emperor,
for a supreme offense against international morality and the
sanctity of treaties," reference being apparently to the origin of
the war and violation of the neutralization treaties.
Special treaties, in the past, have made it illegal, as between
contracting states, to declare war against neutralized states,16 to
declare war for the collection of public contract debts unless an
offer of arbitration has been refused, 17 to declare war on account
of controversies susceptible of arbitration,' and to declare war be-
Elements of International Law, 3rd ed., p. 272. 1 Halleck, however, dis-
cusses just causes of war, 4th ed., 539 and see 7 Moore, International
Law Digest, 171.
13Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States
Senate, 1919, 66th Congress, 1st Sess., Sen. Doc. No. 106, p. 321.
'4Ibid. p. 329.
IsIbid. p. 336.
16Treaties neutralizing Switzerland, 1815, Belgium, 1839, Luxemburg,
1867: 1 Westlake, op. cit. 27 et seq.
II1 Hague Convention, 1907.
18I Hague Convention 1899, art. 16, 1907, art. 38.
The United States has treaties with twenty-eight countries requiring
submission to arbitration of "Differences which may arise of a legal nature
or relating to the interpretation of treaties existing between the two con-
tracting Parties and which it may not have been possible to settle by diplo-
macy . . . provided nevertheless, that they do not affect the vital in-
terests, the independence, or the honor of the two contracting States, and
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fore a delay, usually of a year, for conciliation has elapsed. 9 In
view of such treaties the commission referred to, finding that
"the neutrality of Belgium, guaranteed by the Treaties of the
19th April, 1839, and that of Luxemburg, guaranteed by the
Treaty of the 11th May, 1867, were deliberately violated by
Germany and Austria-Hungary, ' 2o recommended that "the grav-
ity of these outrages upon the principles of the law of nations
and upon international good faith is such that they should be
made the subject of a formal condemnation by the Confer-
ence. ''2 1 The Treaty of Versailles, as has been noted, refers to "a
supreme offense against . . . the sanctity of treaties" as a
ground for arraigning the Kaiser.
The League of Nations Covenant embodies several of the
limitations upon the right to declare war found in earlier special
treaties. Thus, for members of the League, wars of conquest
(art. 10), and wars over controversies which have been arbi-
trated (art. 13), or conciliated by unanimous recommendation
(art. 15) are made illegal, and all wars are forbidden until a
nine months' delay for peaceful settlement has intervened
(art. 12).22
2. THE RIGHT TO REMAIN NEUTRAL
Wheaton said, "The right of every independent state to re-
main at peace while other states are engaged in war is an in-
contestable attribute of sovereignty." 23 This should not be
understood as a guarantee of neutrality. With the exception of
states permanently neutralized by special treaties, such as Bel-
gium between 1831 and 1919, Luxemburg, 1867 to 1919 and
Switzerland since 1815, any state may be put at war against its
do not concern the interests of third Parties." Treaty With Great Britain,
1908, art. 1, Malloy, Treaties, Conventions, etc., p. 814.
'
9 By the Wilson-Bryan Peace Treaties, concluded by the United States
with twenty states, 1913-14 "any dispute arising between the High Con-tracting Parties of whatever nature they may be, shall, when ordinarydiplomatic proceedings have failed and the high Contracting Parties do
not have recourse to arbitration, be submitted for investigation and report
to a Permanent International Commission constituted in the manner pre-
scribed in the following article. The High Contracting Parties agree not
to resort, with respect to each other, to any act of force during the in-
vestigation to be made by the Commission and before its report is handedin." Art. 3 provides that the Commissioner shall report within one
year.
20Hearings before Senate Foreign Relations Committee, p. 325.
"1Ibid., p. 330.
"2Wright, Effects of the League of Nations Covenant, 13 Am. Pol.
Sci. Rev. 562, Nov. 1914.
"3Wheaton, Elements of International Law, 8th ed., (Dana) p. 509.
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will. The customary law of neutrality and the V and XIII
Hague Conventions of 1907 state the rights and obligations of
belligerent and neutral states but do not limit the right of either
to terminate the relation of neutrality by a declaration of war.
2 4
Wheaton's statement means that states are under no obligation
to go to war in the absence of special treaty and that so long as
they do not go to war and belligerents do not make war on them,
belligerents are bound to respect their rights as peaceful states.
For states members of the League this principle is changed by
article 16 of the Covenant which requires them to sever com-
mercial relations or even to commit hostile acts against Covenant
violators. If the League is at war with a member or an outside
state no other member can be really neutral. Furthermore, the
guarantee of Article 10 requires members of the League to de-
part from neutrality in case of external aggression against the
territorial integrity or existing political independence of one of
their number.
3. THE RIGHT TO ATTACK NON-COMBATANTS
Grotius thought that "a war declared against him who has
the supreme authority in a population is considered to be de-
clared against all his subjects. ' 25  In his Social Contract, Rous-
seau took the opposite view that "war is not a relation of man
to man but of state to state, in which individuals are enemies
only accidentally not as men nor even as citizens but as soldiers,
not as members of their country but as its defenders. 2' 6 This
doctrine was approved by Portalis in opening the French Prize
Court in 180127 and a limited application of it is embodied in the
preamble of the Declaration of St. Petersburg, 1868 which reads
"That the only legitimate objects which states should endeavor
to accomplish during war is to weaken the military forces of the
enemy."'28 This doctrine has been opposed, especially by British
writers, because of its inconsistency with practice and because of
the implication it carries with reference to the right to capture
enemy private property at sea.2 9 It has also been opposed, es-
2 4Wright, 5 MINNESOTA LAw REVIEW 405.25Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis, 1. 3 c. 3, par. 9.26Rousseau, Social Contract, 1. 1, c. 4.
27Westlake, op. cit. 2: 40; Hall, op. cit. p. 66.
28Westlake, op. cit. 2: 57. The superior court of military justice of
the German Empire in a decision of Aug. 10, 1915 declared that war is a
contest between States only and does not affect the rights of private indi-
viduals. Clunet, Journal de Droit International Priv6, 1917, p. 257, cited,
Garner, International Law and the World War, 1:4.29Hall, op. cit. p. 70; Westlake, op. cit. 2: 41.
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pecially by German writers, because of the impediment it offers
to the rapid attainment of the objects of war.30
"The greatest kindness in war" wrote von Moltke, "is to
bring it to a speedy conclusion. It should be allowable, with that
view, to employ all methods save those which are absolutely ob-
jectionable. I can by no means profess agreement with the
Declaration of St. Petersburg, when it asserts that the weaken-
ing of the military forces of the enemy is the only lawful pro-
cedure in war. No; you must attack all the resources of the
enemy's government-its finances, its railways, its stores, and
even its prestige."
In spite of these objections, international law has tended to
distinguish between the armed forces and the peaceful popula-
tion of belligerent states and, in accord with Rousseau's theory,
to exempt the latter so far as possible from the rigors of war.31
During the recent war this distinction was to a considerable de-
gree abandoned. Most of the belligerents adopted the practice
of interning resident enemy civilians and of treating them in a
manner similar to, prisoners of war.32 Furthermore, enemy
civilians subject to draft found on neutral vessels on the high
-seas were regarded as "persons embodied in the armed forces
of the enemy" and hence subject to removal by belligerents. 3
All of the belligerents also employed economic pressure upon the
enemy civilian population to the greatest possible extent. By se-
questering enemy private property in their territory and black-
listing enemy firms in neutral countries as well as by confiscating
or destroying enemy private property at sea, by the cutting of
cables and the censorship of mails, by the application of continu-
ous voyage to blockade and indefinitely extend contraband lists,
by the use of mine fields, submarine zones, rationing agreements
with neutrals, domestic embargoes and by other means designed
to cut off the enemy from commerce and intercourse they sought
to bring effective pressure upon the government through the finan-
cial ruin and starvation of its civilian population, as well as
through the elimination of essential military supplies. Finally
Germany adopted a policy of bringing pressure upon the enemy
by terrorizing the civilian population. With this object they bom-
barded cities from warships, aircraft and long range guns, they
30U. S. Rules of Land Warfare, 1914, art. 10, Garner, op. cit. 1: 4.
81U. S. Rules of Land Warfare, art. 29; IV Hague Convention, 1907
annex, arts. 1-3; Westlake, op. cit. 2: 41.
321 Garner, op. cit. 56 et seq.
33Ibid., 2: 362 et seq.
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sank merchant vessels without warning and they levied severe
collective punishments in occupied areas by heavy fines, destruc-
tion of cities, deportation and execution of civilians. 4
The development in the recent war of these methods, which
subjected civilians in an unusual degree to the hardships of war,
may be accounted for by three circumstances: (1) The general
adoption of universal compulsory military service which ren-
dered every able bodied enemy subject a potential if not an
actual member of the armed forces.3 5 (2) The development of
a highly centralized government control of all national resources
including food and raw materials of manufacture, thus destroy-
ing the distinction between imports intended for civilian use and
imports intended for the armed forces.36 (3) The development
of a theory of psychology on the part of the Germans that na-
tional morale could be broken by physical terrorization of the
civilian population37 and on the part of the allies that national
morale could be broken by the economic starvation of the civil-
ian population. 8
It seems probable that if wars continue the administrative
and technical conditions represented by the first two of these
circumstances will continue and consequently, in so far, civ-
ilians will suffer from the war. Experience during the war
seems to have demonstrated that the German view of national
psychology was not well founded. Terrorism seems to have
resulted in a stimulation of energy and determination. The air
raids on London aided the recruiting officer, and the fall of
Big Bertha shells in Paris aroused the waning spirit of France
to renewed determination. The allies' view of national psy-
chology, on the other hand, which had been demonstrated by
the experience of the Napoleonic wars and fortified by that of
the American Civil War, was reinforced by that of the World
War. A gradual loss of wealth and decline in the abundance
of luxuries, conveniences and even necessities of life, does
not sting the people into renewed effort as does a sudden bar-
34For full discussion of these practices see Garner op. cit.
35The Frederico, Conseil du Prises, France, March 15, 1915, 42 Clunet,
192, and supra note 33.
36British note to U. S. Feb. 10, 1915, U. S. White Book, European War
No. 1, p. 51 (hereafter cited White Book), quoted with approval in The
Kim, L. R. [1915] P. 215.37Kellogg, 122 Atlantic Monthly, 289, (Sept. 1918.)
3sThis is not a new thory. See Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power
upon History, p. 198, Sea Power in Relation to the War of 1812 1: 288.
Printed in Mahan on Naval Warfare, 96, 139.
THE WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
barity. It slowly breeds irritability and discontent, arouses sus-
picions of hoarding and government inefficiency, a weariness of
war and withdrawal of popular support from renewed military
effort.
If this analysis is correct it would seem that methods of
terrorism may continue to be prohibited by the law of war.
If, however, by the use of poison gases it becomes possible to
destroy entire civilian populations this argument would not hold.
Annihilation might be of military advantage even if the psy-
chological effect of terrorizing were not. We may conclude that
in the future the law of war must modify its distinction be-
tween armed forces and civilian populations and that the lat-
ter are likely to suffer more in future wars than they have
in the past.
4. THE RIGHT TO EIPLOY NOVEL INSTRUMENTS OF WAR
Natural science reinforced military science to a high de-
gree during the war, its leading contributions being the wire-
less telegraph, air craft, submarines and poison gases. The
world war first witnessed the extensive adaptation of these in-
ventions to military purposes. New instruments of war have
generally been looked upon with disfavor on their introduc-
tion. The cross-bow, fire arms, chain shot, explosive bullets,
dum-dum bullets, have been at different times prohibited.3 9
The Hague Declaration of 1899 relating to air craft expired
in five years, and though the Hague Conference of 1907 at-
tempted to prohibit the dropping of explosives from air craft4"
and the bombardment "by any means whatever" of undefended
towns and villages41 the conventions containing these provisions
were not strictly binding in the world war because some of
the belligerents had not ratified. 42 One of the Hague Declara-
tions of 1899 forbade "the use of projectiles the sole object of
which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases"
which was binding until entry into the war by the United States,
the only non-ratifying belligerent.43  The prohibition against
39Maine, International Law, p. 139; 1 Halleck, op. cit. 618; Lawrence,
op. cit. p. 543.40XIV Hague Conventions 1907.
4'IV Hague Conventions 1907, annex art. 25.42The Hague Conventions relating to war and neutrality all containthe clause "the provisions are binding between contracting powers and
only if all the belligerents are parties to the convention."43Brazil and Cuba had also failed to ratify but they did not enter the
war until after the United States.
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poison and poisoned weapons in article 23a of the Hague Con-
ventions of 1899 and 1907, though binding through the war
does not seem to include poison gases.4
The effort to prohibit specific instruments of war has never
availed if the weapon has proved effective. Most weapons
can be used in a number of ways and it would seem in prin-
ciple that the manner and effect of use in particular circum-
stances is the proper subject for legal regulation rather than the
instrument itself. Thus the use of aircraft for observation and
bombardment of armed enemy forces could hardly be objected
to whatever opinion might be entertained of aerial bombard-
ment of cities. So also submarine operations against enemy
warships would seem unobjectionable. Poison gases even if
their use is confined to enemy armed forces would be objec-
tionable if the amount of suffering their use involves is in ex-
cess of the military advantage gained. Radio telegraphy has
not raised questions as between belligerents though this in-
vention has added to the burden of neutrals in preventing their
territory being used as a base of belligerent operations.
It is believed that the law of war will not prohibit the use
of particular instruments, except in rare cases such as poison,
dum-dum and small explosive bullets. The general prohibition
against "arms, projectiles, or material calculated to cause un-
necessary suffering" in the Hague conventions of 1899 and
190744a seems to state the correct theory and to cover all mili-
tary inventions. Instruments of war must of course be used
in a manner to accord with established principles of interna-
tional law, but even with this limitation most instruments, and
probably all of those here under discussion still have a field of
usefulness. Careful consideration, however, might well be given
to regulating in detail the manner in which these new inven-
tions may legitimately be used.
5. DEPARTURES FROm LAW IN RETALIATION
Much of the discussion with reference to belligerent and
neutral action during the war hinged on the contention that al-
leged departures from the laws of war and neutrality were jus-
tified by exceptional circumstances. Does the war experience
make possible a tentative definition of the exceptional circum-
441 Garner op. cit. 277.
44aArt. 23 e.
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stances which will in fact justify a departure from law? Such
exceptional circumstances may originate in the -will of the party
acted against, in the will of the party acting, or in an external
will beyond the control of either of these parties. In other
words, departures from law may be based on retaliation, con-
venience or necessity. Under each of these cases we may con-
sider successively the justifiability of extraordinary measures
by belligerents against enemies, by belligerents against neutrals,
and by neutrals against belligerents.
The lex talionis is well established in international law.
"The law of war," says Lieber's Instructions, "can no more
wholly dispense with retaliation than can the law of nations, of
which it is a branch. '45
Thus after Germany had violated international law by using
poison gas, bombing undefended towns, etc., an exceptional cir-
cumstance existed which justified the allies in doing likewise,
though according to recognized principles :46
"Retaliation will . . . never be resorted to as a measure of
mere revenge, but only as a means of protective retribution, and,
moreover, cautiously and unavoidably; that is to say, retaliation
shall only be resorted to after careful inquiry into the real oc-
currence, and the character of the misdeeds that may demand
retribution."
The principle doubtless applies to belligerent action in
derogation of neutral rights. If a neutral has failed to fulfill his
positive obligations of neutrality, the injured belligerent may re-
taliate :47
"Suppose," said the British note of April 24, 1916, "that a
neutral failed to prevent his territory being made use of by one
of the belligerents for warlike purposes; could he object to the
other belligerent acting in the same way?"
Thus after China had failed to prevent Japan using her terri-
tory for conducting operations against Tsing Tau, Germany was
doubtless justified in attacking Japanese troops in that territory.48
Germany invoked the principle of retaliation to justify her
submarine warfare. It could hardly be alleged that retaliation
against enemy illegalities cAn justify acts impairing the funda-
45Lieber's Instructions, art. 27; U. S. Rules of Land Warfare, 1914,
art. 380.46Lieber's Instructions, art 28; U. S. Rules of Land Warfare, 1914,
art. 381.
47Par. 38, White Book, No. 3, p. 77.
482 Garner, op. cit. 239.
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mental rights of an innocent neutral and Germany did not allege
this. She asserted, however, that the neutrals affected were not
innocent since they had, to her detriment, acquiesced in enemy
impairments of their rights, although they possessed a means of
compelling respect.4"
"The German Government" wrote Foreign Minister von
Jagow, "have given due recognition to the fact that as a matter
of form the exercise of rights and the toleration of wrong on
the part of neutrals is limited by their pleasure alone and in-
volves no formal breach of neutrality. The German Govern-
ment have not in consequence made any charge of formal breach
of neutrality. The German Government can not, however, do
otherwise, especially in the interest of absolute clearness in the
relations between the two countries, than to emphasize that
they, in common with the public opinion in Germany, feel them-
selves placed at a great disadvantage through the fact that
the neutral powers have hitherto achieved no success or only
an unmeaning success in their assertion of the right to trade
with Germany, acknowledged to be legitimate by international
law, whereas they make unlimited use of their right to tolerate
trade in contraband with England and our other enemies. Con-
ceded that it is the formal right of neutrals not to protect their
legitimate trade with Germany and even to allow themselves
knowingly and willingly to be induced by England to restrict
such trade, it is on the other hand not less their good right, al-
though unfortunately not exercised, to stop trade in contraband,
especially the trade in arms, with Germany's enemies. In view
of this situation the German government see themselves com-
pelled, after six months of patience and watchful waiting, to
meet England's murderous method of conducting maritime war-
fare with drastic counter measures."
Nor was Germany alone in this contention. Said Great Britain
in her Memorandum of April 24, 1916:50
"The mere abstract question of the legitimacy of measures of
retaliation adopted by one belligerent against his opponent, but
affecting neutrals also, is one of which His Majesty's gov-
ernment think the discussion might well be deferred. It is a sub-
ject of considerable difficulty and complexity, but His Majesty's
government are surprised to notice that the government of the
states seem to regard such measures of retaliation in war as il-
legal if they should incidentally inflict injury upon neutrals. The
advantage which any such principle would give to the deter-
mined law-breaker would be so great that His Majesty's gov-
ernment can not conceive that it would commend itself to the
conscience of mankind. To take a simple instance, suppose that
49Note to U. S. Feb. 16, 1915, White Book, No. 1, p. 57.
5oPar. 38, Ibid. No. 3, p. 77.
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one belligerent scatters mines on the trade routes so as to im-
pede or destroy the commerce of his enemy-an action which is
illegitimate and calculated to inflict injury upon neutrals as well
as upon the other belligerents-what is that belligerent to do?
Is he precluded from meeting in any way this lawless attack
upon him by his enemy? His Majesty's government can not
think that he is not entitled by way of retaliation to scatter mines
in his turn, even though in so doing he also interferes with neu-
tral rights. Or take an even more extreme case. Suppose that
a neutral failed to prevent his territory being made use of by
one of the belligerents for warlike purposes, could he object to
the other belligerent acting in the same way? It would seem that
the true view must be that each belligerent is entitled to insist on
being allowed to meet his enemy on terms of equal liberty of
action. If one of them is allowed to make an attack upon the
other regardless of neutral rights, his opponent must be allowed
similar latitude in prosecuting the struggle, nor should he in that
case be limited to the adoption of measures precisely identical
with those of his opponent."
This seems to assert a belligerent right to retaliate against neu-
trals, not only for failure to meet their positive duties but for
failure effectively to assert their rights. The same argument was
used during the French revolutionary and Napoleonic wars.5'
In the present war as then, the United States was unwilling to
accept it.52
"If the course pursued by the present enemies of Great
Britain," wrote Secretary of State Bryan in 1915, "should prove
in fact to be tainted by illegality and disregard of the principles
of war sanctioned by enlightened nations, it can not be supposed,
and this government does not for a moment suppose, that His
5
'See discussion of French retaliatory decrees, 1795, 1797, 5 Moore,
Digest, 592, 598, and of British and French retaliatory measures 1806,
1807, Ibid. 7: 798. Lord Stowell justified condemnation of an American
vessel under the British retaliatory orders in Council with the remark
"I have not observed that these Orders in Council, in their retaliatory
character, have been described in the argument as at all repugnant to the
law of nations, however liable to be so described if merely original and
abstract." (The Fox, Edw. Adm. 311, 1811; 2 Roscoe's Prize Cases, 61.)
This decision was criticized in the Edinburgh Review, Feb. 1812 quoted
7 Moore, Digest, 648, was cited with approval by Sir Samuel Evans in
The Zamora, L. R. [1916] P. 43 and by Sir Edward Grey in a note to the
United States, July 31, 1915, (White Book, No. 2 p. 181) but was criti-
cized by Lord Parker of Waddington in The Zamora L. R. [1916] 2 A. C.95. The American claimants in this case contended that the Orders in
Council had ceased to have any justification as retaliatory measures be-
cause Napoleon had already withdrawn his obnoxious Berlin and Milan
decrees by the Cadore letter of August 5, 1810, but Lord Stowell denied
that the letter had had such an effect. (See Fish, American Diplomacy,
p. 168.)52Note March 30, 1915, White Book No. 1, p. 70. See also note Oct.
21, 1915, par. 33, Ibid. No. 3, p. 37.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
Majesty's government would wish the same taint to attach to
their own actions or would cite such illegal acts as in any sense
or degree a justification for similar practices on their part in so
far as they affect neutral rights."
The United States, however, insisted that in fact it had not
acquiesced in illegalities by either belligerent. 53 It is believed
that a neutral which fails to exert "due diligence" to protect its
fundamental rights on the high seas although not liable to repar-
ation as is a neutral which fails to use due diligence to prevent
its territory being used as a base of belligerent operations, is
nevertheless liable to losses incident to retaliation by the injured
belligerent against the enemy. It should be noted, however, that
the "due diligence" of a neutral in asserting its rights at sea
can not be measured by its success in actually protecting them.
Consistent failure of a neutral to prevent its territory being used
as a base of operations creates a strong presumption that the neu-
tral has not employed due diligence, but no such presumption
follows from consistent failure to gain results from protests
against belligerent illegalities at sea.
Neutrals may undoubtedly retaliate against belligerents. The
V Hague Convention of 1907 permits a belligerent to utilize rail-
way material coming from neutral territory when "absolutely
necessary" but "a neutral power may likewise, in case of neces-
sity, retain and utilize to an equal extent material coming from
the territory of the belligerent power" (Art. 19). Resistance by
neutral merchant vessels to visit and search is ordinarily illegal
but the United States was unquestionably justified in placing
an armed guard on American merchant vessels "in view of the
announcement of the Imperial German government on January
31, 1917, that all ships, those of neutrals included, met within
certain zones of the high seas, would be sunk without any pre-
caution being taken for the safety of the persons on board and
without the exercise of visit and search."5 4 Similarly the vari-
ous American states were justified in assuming an attitude of
partiality toward the Allies and the United States after entry
of the latter into the war, in retaliation for repeated German
violations of neutral rights.5 5 In fact, however, these Latin Amer-
ican decrees generally professed to be based on Pan-American
53Note to Germany April 21, 1915, Ibid. No. 1, p. 74.
54Naval War College, International Law Documents, 1917, p. 275.
5sSee Brazilian Notification, April 11, 1917 and Peruvian Notification,
Oct. 6, 1917, N. W. C., Int. Law Docs., 1917, pp. 64, 198.
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solidarity rather than on retaliation. 56 Such retaliatory acts by
neutrals may be taken by the belligerent affected as acts of war,
as Uruguay admitted in asking Germany whether she regarded
Uruguay at war after the latter had opened her ports to Ameri-
can war vessels.57
6. DEPARTURES FROM LAW AT CONVENIENCE
Assertion by a state of the right of retaliation is, however,
very different from assertion of a right to depart from the law
in view of novel circumstances created by its own act or inten-
tion, though the latter doctrine has been asserted by some text
writers and as embodied in the German War Book has become
known as the "German doctrine of military necessity."58 In ac-
cordance with this doctrine the strategic advantage to Germany
of an invasion of France from Belgium was said by Chancellor
Bethmann-Hollweg to create a necessity justifying violation of
the neutralization of Belgium and Luxemburg.59 The imme-
diate military advantage gained by terrorizing the population of
invaded territory was thought by the German command to justify
brutality against civilians contrary to the rules of war.60 The
"vital interests" of Germany were said to justify submarine war-
fare against merchant vessels."' The results of these measures
seem to indicate that perhaps ultimate success would really have
been more nearly attained by strict observance of the law.
Similar arguments were used to justify belligerent action
against neutrals but they were not accepted. Thus the military
56Decrees and notifications by Brazil, June 4, 1917; Costa Rica, April
12, 1917; Guatemala, April 28, 1917; Peru, July 28, 1917; Salvador, Oct. 6,
1917; Uruguay, June 18, 1917; N. W. C., Int. Law Docs., 1917, pp. 64,
77, 162, 197, 210, 249.57N. Y. Times Current History, 8 (pt. 1) p. 429, N. W. C., Int. Law
Docs., 1918, p. 11.
582 Garner, op. cit. 195; Infra Note 83.5 9
"Gentlemen, we are now acting in self defense. Necessity knows no
law. Our troops have occupied Luxemburg and have possibly already
entered on Belgian soil. Gentlemen, that is a breach of international law.
The French government has notified Brussels that it would respect Belgian
neutrality as long as the adversary respected it. But we know that France
stood ready for an invasion. France could wait, we could not. A French
invasion in our flank and the lower Rhine might have been disastrous.
Thus we were forced to ignore the rightful protests of the Governments
of Luxemburg and Belgium. The injustice-I speak openly-the injustice
we thereby commit we will try to make good as soon as our military aims
have been attained. He who is menaced as we are and is fighting for his
All, can only consider the one and best way to strike." Speech of Imperial
Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg in Reichstag, Aug. 4, 1914.
6OKellogg, 122 Atlantic Monthly 289, (Sept. 1918).8
'White Book, No. 1, p. 53.
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advantage accruing from the use of submarine vessels did not
justify their use in a manner contrary to accepted rules of mari-
time warfare.62
"The government of the United States," wrote Secretary
Bryan in the first Lusitania note, "desires to call the attention of
the Imperial German Government with the utmost earnestness
to the fact that the objection to their present method of attack
against the trade of their enemies lies in the practical impossi-
bility of employing submarines in the destruction of commerce
without disregarding those rules of fairness, reason, justice, and
humanity, which all modern opinion regards as imperative."
Nor can a neutral, which desires to continue that status, de-
part from the accepted rules from motives of interest or sympa-
thy. This applies not only to generally accepted rules but to
regulations which the neutral may have issued at discretion at
the beginning of the war. Thus though the United States was
unquestionably at liberty to impose an impartial prohibition upon
trade in arms at the beginning of the war, as did Brazil,6 3 having
chosen not to interfere with such trade, it would have been un-
neutral to have altered the regulations later when the legitimate
military effort of one belligerent had excluded its enemy from
the benefits of that trade.
64
"This government," wrote Secretary of State Bryan to Ger-
many, "is constrained to hold, in view of the present indisput-
able doctrines of accepted international law, that any change in
its own laws of neutrality during the progress of a war which
would affect unequally the relations of the United States with
the nations at war would be an unjustifiable departure from the
principle of strict neutrality by which it has consistently sought
to direct its actions. . . . The placing of an embargo on
the trade in arms at the present time would constitute such a
change and be a direct violation of the neutrality of the United
States."
There is only one way in which a state may by unilateral act
change its obligations under the international law of neutrality,
and that is by assuming the responsibilities of war. A belliger-
ent may increase his rights and reduce his obligations toward a
neutral by declaring war against it, and a neutral is equally free
to declare war against a belligerent. This being done:65
21Ibid. No. 1, p. 76. The attempted justification of submarine warfare
against neutrals on the grounds of retaliation has been referred to, supra
note 49.
63Rules, August 4, 1914, art. 4, N. W. C., Int. Law Docs. 1916, p. 10.
64White Book, No. 1, p. 75.
65U. S. Rules of Land Warfare, 1914, art. 11.
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"Military necessity justifies a resort to all the measures which
are indispensable for securing the object of war and which are
not forbidden by the modern laws and customs of war."
Even the right to declare war is somewhat limited under the
League of Nations Covenant, but short of the exercise of that
right, a state is clearly bound by the law of neutrality.
But it has been suggested that some of the traditional prac-
tices of war and neutrality do not in reality involve fundamental
principles and are not obligatory if changed conditions render
their observance inexpedient. Thus while the United States was
neutral the British government continually emphasized the dis-
tinction between acts affecting "life" and those affecting "prop-
erty" implying that some rules of neutrality are more funda-
mental than others.66 This contention seems to be admitted by
Secretary of State Bryan in his note of March 30, 1915 :67
"The government of the United States is, of course, not
oblivious to the great changes which have occurred in the con-
ditions and means of naval warfare since the rules hitherto gov-
erning legal blockade were formulated. It might be ready to ad-
mit that the old form of 'close' blockade with its cordon of ships
in the immediate offing of the blockaded ports is no longer prac-
ticable in face of an enemy possessing the means and oppor-
tunity to make an effective defense by the use of submarines,
mines, and aircraft; but it can hardly be maintained that, what-
ever form of effective blockade may be made use of, it is impos-
sible to conform at least to the spirit and principles of the estab-
lished rules of war."
This principle was invoked by the allies to justify departures
from hitherto accepted methods for enforcing belligerent rights
at sea. Thus the great size of modern merchant vessels and the
bulkiness of their cargoes was claimed to justify search in port.6s
The use of mine fields, submarines, and aircraft by enemies was
claimed to justify distant blockades.69 The ease of transit from
adjacent neutrals to belligerents was claimed to justify applica-
tion of the doctrines of continuous voyage and ultimate destina-
tion to conditional contraband and blockade."0 The enemy con-
trol of foodstuffs and other articles of conditional contraband
66Moore, Principles of American Diplomacy, p. 80.67White Book, No. 1, p. 70.
68The Zamora L. R. [1916], 2 A. C. 108, 2 British and Colonial PrizeCases 28; Higgins, ed. Hall, International Law, p. 801; British Memoran-
dum to United States, April 24, 1916, pars. 4-8, White Book, No. 3, p. 64.69Supra note 67.
70The Kim, L. R. [1915] P. 215; British Memorandum to U. S., April
24, 1916, par. 18, White Book, No. 3, p. 70.
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was claimed to justify a treatment of such goods as absolute
contraband.71 New means of communication was claimed to
justify modification of traditional prize court procedure and
rules of evidence.
72
Although these novel methods of the allies were protested by
neutrals, yet the protests were much less emphatic than those
occasioned by the novelties in maritime warfare introduced by
Germany. Instead of search in port and a virtual extension of
blockade to neutral ports, Germany employed the submarine to
sink merchant vessels at sight in defined war zones as a blockade
measure.7 3 The distinction would seem to lie in the fact that
Germany impaired much more fundamental neutral rights than
did the allies.7 4 The exact process by which a ship engaged in a
prohibited trade is compelled or induced to come into a belligerent
port is of less importance to neutral states than the personal safety
of their citizens legitimately traveling on the high seas.
Though doubtless customary international law must be cap-
able of adaptation to new conditions, and distinctions must be
recognized in the binding character of its principles and rules,
yet it must be emphasized that the elaboration of such distinc-
tions by belligerents and neutrals in time of war is a process at-
tended with considerable risk for the stability of law. The law
of neutrality has grown up on compromises between belligerent
and neutral interests with due consideration to the peculiar inter-
ests of states relying on naval power and states relying on land
power, of states with numerous ports and land-locked states, of
states with ample raw materials and states without.
74a A slight
interference with such a structure of compromise in time of stress
is likely to bring the whole to the ground.75
7'Supra note 36.
72British Memorandum, cited, Par. 13, White Book, No. 3 p. 68.
73Note to U. S. Jan. 31, 1917, White Book, No. 4, p. 404, 405.
7
4In criticizing Professor Garner's discussion of German and allied
maritime methods, Professor Corwin does not notice this distinction. 4
Weekly Review 202, March 2, 1921.
74aSupra notes 5, 6.
75U. S. note to Great Britain, Oct. 21, 1915, pars. 33-35, White Book,
No. 3, p. 38. The compromise character of conventional rules of maritime
international law and the dependence of the whole upon the exact preser-
vation of each part is illustrated by the memorandum of the drafting
committee upon article 65 of the Declaration of London (Naval War
College, International Law Topics, 1909, p. 155, 4 MINNESOTA LAW RE-
viw 20), and by the disastrous effect upon this whole codification of law
when some of the belligerents insisted upon a few modifications. (White
Book, No. 1, pp. 5-8.)
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7. DEPARTURES FROm LAW UNDER NECESSITY
We have now come to the class of cases in which a departure
from the normal laws of war and neutrality has occurred, most
difficult to pass upon, namely those in which a belligerent or a
neutral has invoked in justification exceptional circumstances be-
yond the control either of itself or of the state which will be ad-
versely affected by the act. Such exceptional circumstances in-
clude not only "force majeure" or "act of God" but also acts of
compelling character of a mundane third party. They are said
to occasion a "necessity" which will justify departure from in-
ternational law.
As between belligerents it is well recognized that certain hu-
mane practices, called by Grotius temperamenta belli7 6 should
be observed unless unexpected circumstances intervene. So by
the IV Hague Convention of 1907 (art. 2 3g) it is forbidden "to
destroy or seize the enemy's property, unless such destruction
or seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities of
war" and in the naval bombardment of military supplies, accord-
ing to the IX Hague Convention (art. 2) a belligerent "incurs
no responsibility for any unazoidable damage which may be
caused."
The same distinction may be made with reference to neutral
rights. Though a belligerent is normally obliged to refrain from
destroying neutral merchant vessels, yet by the unratified Declara-
tion of London (art. 49), if he can place the persons on board in
safety he may destroy a neutral vessel liable to condemnation if
failure to do so "would involve danger to the ship of war or to
the success of the operations in which she is at the time engaged."
So also by the V Hague Convention of 1907 (art. 19) a bel-
ligerent may utilize railway material coming from neutral terri-
tory "where and to the extent absolutely necessary," and in
maritime warfare a similar belligerent right of taking neutral
vessels in port is recognized under the custom of angary.77
A neutral state may depart from the usual regulations of
neutrality in the presence of circumstances over which it has
no control which menace its rights. Thus though the preamble
of the XIII Hague Convention of 1907 asserts that neutral regu-
lations shall not be altered in the course of the war yet excep-
76Grotius, op. cit. lib. iii, c. 10.
77Wilson and Tucker, International Lav, 7th ed., p. 320.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
tion is made where experience has shown the necessity for such
change for the protection of the rights of that power. Chile in-
voked this provision to justify modification of her coaling regu-
lations as did Spain to justify modification of her regulations
for sojourn, so as to exclude submarines. 78 As has been noticed
the United States found no circumstances which would justify
departure from her practice of permitting individuals to trade in
munitions of war from American territory.
79
From these examples it is clear that conventional and cus-
tomary international law recognizes that certain rules may be
overridden in case of necessity though it must be a real neces-
sity and not a mere convenience. It is difficult to define accurate-
ly the circumstances which give evidence of such a necessity but
it seems clear that they must be matters of fact the menace of
which is ascertainable by objective proof, and not mere opinions
as to distant dangers ;80 that they must be exceptional and con-
trary to the normal course of events;"1 that they must be un-
intended and beyond the control of the party invoking them.
8 2
78Naval War College, Int. Law Docs., 1916, p. 22, 1917, p. 213.
79Supra note 64.
80"Necessity is a defence when it is shown that the act charged was
done to avoid an evil both serious and irreparable; that there was no other
adequate means of escape; and that the remedy was not disproportioned
to the evil" (Wharton, Criminal Law, sec. 95.) In a classic statement
Secretary of State Webster said "a necessity of self defence" must be
"instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means and no moment
for deliberation" and "must be limited by that necessity and kept clearly
within it." (2 Moore, Digest, 412). Wharton agrees with this that "the
right of self defence can only be appealed to to ward off a danger that
is actual and immediate" (op. cit. sec. 97a, 102) but necessity goes beyond
mere self defence. While the latter excuses only "the repulse of a wrong,
necessity justifies the invasion of a right" (sec. 97), thus anticipating the
future on the Roman law doctrine, "Melius est occurrere in tempore, quam
post exitum vindicate." L. 1 c. (3. 17).
81"It is submitted that military necessity can only be invoked to
justify the destruction of a prize in the presence of exceptional circum-
stances which were unforeseen and beyond human powers of control. Of
.this character would be the state of the sea, tHe unseaworthiness or slow-
ness of the prize, or the depletion of the captor cruiser's crew by unfore-
seen circumstances. Circumstances which are the rule and known before
the belligerent vessel leaves its home port, such as an absence of colonial
ports to which a prize might be sent, or the inherent inability of the type
of vessel employed to carry a crew sufficient to furnish prize crews, can
not be pleaded as grounds of military necessity. In the former case, the
circumstances are exceptional and unpremeditated. In the latter, they are
the rule and foreseen. In the former case, the intention is to bring the
prize in, but circumstances have prevented. In the latter case, the inten-
tion is to destroy all vessels." Wright, 11 Am. Journ. Int. Law, 376.
82"It has been sometimes said that necessity can never be advanced as
a defence when the necessity is the result of the defendant's own culpable
act. This cannot be accepted as universally true. . . . But if the
necessity be rashly rushed into, it may cease to be a defence." Wharton,
op. cit. sec. 96. See also, supra note 81.
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There are, however, many prohibitions in the laws of war and
neutrality stated in absolute terms by treaty. Can these be over-
ridden by necessity? The doctrine of Kriegsraison as stated by
Professor Lueder asserts that they can. 3 We agree with West-
lake and others that this position seriously jeopardizes the law84
and ignores the fact that the law itself has taken account of all
the "necessities" really essential to the effective prosecution of
war.
85
Thus in applying the doctrine of necessity we must guard
against two errors, that of considering a convenience a neces-
sity, and that of regarding an absolute prohibition as qualified.
The attempted justification of the invasion of Belgium commit-
ted both errors. There was no objective evidence of a menace
to Germany from French invasion through Belgium sufficient
83"The justifiableness of kriegsraison can not be denied on occasions of
extreme necessity. If the necessity of individuals is recognized as exempt-ing them from punishment for things never so injurious done by them
from that necessity, this must be still more the case in war since so much
more is at stake. When therefore the circumstances are such that the at-
tainment of the object of the war and the escape from extreme danger
would be hindered by observing the limitations imposed by the laws of
war, and can only be accomplished by breaking through those limitations,
the latter is what ought to happen. It ought to happen because it musthappen, that is, because the course of no war will in such extreme cases
be hindered and allow itself to end in defeat, perhaps in ruin, in order
not to violate formal law. No prohibition can in such a case effect any
thing, or present a claim to recognition and validity; and it would be idle
to formulate one, for from what commander or from what state could
such heroism of meekness and renunciation be expected?" (Lueder in
Holtzendorff, Handbuch des V6lkerrechts, vol. 4, sec. 66, p. 255, trans. in
Westlake, Collected Papers, p. 244.)84Westlake, Collected Papers, p. 246-247; 2 International Law 128; 2
Cobbett, op. cit. 96; 2 Garner, op. cit. 196-198.85By recognizing both the special necessity to disregard temperamenta
belli in exceptional emergencies (supra) and the general necessity to
destroy life and property in a manner contrary to the law of peace in
order to accomplish the objects of war. "Military necessity justifies a re-
sort to all the measures which are indispensable for securing this object(of war) and which are not forbidden by the modern laws and customs of
war." (U. S. Rules of Land Warfare, 1914, art. 11, see also arts. 12, 13,
repeating Lieber's Instructions, arts. 15, 16.) Grotius states as the basis of
the natural law of war, "The means which lead to an end in a moral
matter receive their intrinsic value from the end: wherefore the steps
that are necessary (to a lawful end), necessity being taken not in physical
exactness but morally, we have a right to use." (op. cit. lib. iii, c. 1, par. 2.
See also IV Hague Convention, 1907, Preamble; 2 Westlake, International
Law, 61; 2 Cobbett, op. cit. 95, note g. Lueder admits that appeal to
Kriegsraison "can only be of exceptional occurrence, for the laws of war
are so framed by ordinary custom and well weighed conventions that
ordinarily it is possible to follow them. They are built on those relations
of fact which are usually met with, just as are the rules of public national
law and private law, and in the one case as in the other only special ex-
ceptional conditions can make it impossible to follow them." (Holtzendorff,
loc. cit., Westlake, Collected Papers, p. 244.)
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to create a real necessity, and even had there been, the prohibi-
tions of the neutralization treaty of 1839 being absolute, inva-
sion of Belgium by German troops would not have been justifi-
able.8 1 As to submarine warfare, although the prohibition against
destruction of merchant vessels is qualified, yet the prohibition
against endangering the lives of non-combatants traveling in
them is absolute. Furthermore it can not be said that the diffi-
culty of bringing in prizes due to geographical facts existent be-
fore the war was an exceptional circumstance such as to create
a genuine necessity." The seizure of Dutch ships by Great
Britain and the United States in 1918 presents a doubtful case.
The prohibition against seizure of innocent neutral vessels in
belligerent ports is clearly qualified by the custom of angary,
but did a real necessity exist? It would seem that the shortage
of shipping was an ascertained fact menacing allied existence,
for which not they, but an exceptional circumstance, the illegal
German submarine warfare was responsible.88
Discussions during the world war seem to indicate that de-
parture from the established law, both by belligerents and by
neutrals, may be justified by exceptional circumstances but the
convenience of the state so departing can never in itself be such
a circumstance. As the preamble of the IV Hague Convention
points out the law itself has been drawn in view of "military
requirements" and is not to be set aside by them. Yet it can not
be denied that neutrals have shown a tendency to acquiesce in
belligerent adaptations of customary procedure to new condi-
tions so long as fundamental principles of the law have not
been imparied. Departure from certain customary practices may
be justified by necessity arising from well -authenticated, excep-
tional and unintended circumstances clearly menacing vital in-
terests, and the conventional laws of war and neutrality have in
terms provided for such departures. Necessity does not, how-
ever, justify departures from absolute prohibitions of law. These
may be justified only as retaliation for equal and unremedied
departures by the party to be adversely affected.
8. RESPONSI3ILITY FOR VIOLATION OF THE LAW OF WAR
The IV Hague Convention of 1907 dealing with the law of
war on land provided that "a belligerent party which violates"
its provisions "shall, if the case demands, be liable to pay com-
862 Garner, op. cit. 201-202, supra, note 59.
871 Ibid. 373, supra, note 81.
ssNaval War College, Int. Law Docs., 1918, p. 166.
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pensation. It shall be responsible for all acts committed by per-
sons forming part of its armed forces." (Art. 3.) The Commis-
sion of the Peace Conference on Responsibilities listed thirty-
two offenses of which Germany was found to be guilty and con-
cluded:
"The war was carried on by the Central Empires together with
their allies, Turkey and Bulgaria, by barbarous or illegitimate
methods in violation of the established laws and customs of war
and the elementary laws of humanity."8' 9
In their acceptance of the German offer to make peace on the
basis of President Wilson's fourteen points, the Allied powers
interpreted the seventh and eighth points declaring that "invaded
territories must be restored as well as evacuated and freed," to
imply that Germany compensate "for all damages done to the
civilian populations of the allies and their property by the aggres-
sion of Germany by land, by sea and from the air." 90 By article
232 of the Peace Treaty Germany acknowledges her liability
"for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allied and
Associated Powers and to their property during the period of
belligerency of each of the Allied or Associated Powers against
Germany by such aggression by land, by sea, and from the air."
This liability is undoubtedly in excess of that contemplated by
the Hague Convention and in fact is based upon Germany's re-
sponsibility for causing the war as well as upon her violations
of international law in conducting military operations.91  It
would seem that more careful distinction of these two liabilities
would have been desirable. The making of war even without
moral justification has not heretofore been an illegal act entitling
to compensation, while the illegal conduct of war has. Under the
peace treaty both types of act are regarded as illegal.
Aside from the financial liability of the state for violations
of international law, the personal responsibility of civilians, sol-
diers, and officers was discussed by the Commission on Respon-
sibilities, with the conclusion "all persons belonging to enemy
countries, however high their position may have been, without
distinction of rank, including chiefs of states, who have been
guilty of offenses against the laws and customs of war or the
laws of humanity, are liable to criminal prosecution. '92 This re-
port was objected to by the American and Japanese representa-
89Hearings, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, p. 327.90Note, Nov. 5, 1918, N. W. C., Int. Law Docs., 1918, p. 212.
91See art. 231 quoted supra part 1.92Hearings, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, p. 328.
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tives on the ground that it neglected the usual immunity of heads
of states, and that it asserted a liability for offenses against "hu-
manity" as well as against law.93 The latter objection seems to
be well founded and the term "humanity" was eliminated from
article 228 of the peace treaty. The doctrine of sovereign's im-
munity, however, seems to be a rule "of practical expediency in
municipal law and is not fundamental."" Military law recog-
nizes no such immunity. Enemy sovereigns can be made pris-
oners of war and there is nothing to indicate that they are
exempt from the jurisdiction of courts martial. International
law seems to accord a sovereign immunity from the ordinary
civil courts but not from military or international courts.
9 5
The Commission on Responsibility asserted:
"There is little doubt that the ex-Kaiser and others in high au-
thority were cognizait of and could at least have mitigated the
barbarities committed during the course of the war. A word from
them would have brought about a different method in the action
of their subordinates on land, at sea and in the air." 96
The report thus seemed to contemplate the punishment of per-
sons "not only for directly ordering illegal acts of war but for
having abstained from preventing 'such acts." To this doctrine
of "negative criminality" the American representatives object-
ed,97 and in fact the liability of the Kaiser, recognized by article
227 of the peace treaty, was not for failure to prevent violations
of the law of war but for "a supreme offense against interna-
tional morality and the sanctity of treaties."
The report also emphasized that "civil and military authori-
ties cannot be relieved from responsibility by the mere fact that
a higher authority might have been convicted of the same of-
fense. It will be for the court to decide whether a plea of su-
perior orders is sufficient to acquit the person charged from re-
sponsibility."9 8 Although in common law countries, (differing
in this respect from civil law countries), the orders of a su-
perior authority are not in general a defense, the American rules
of land war provided that "individuals of the armed forces will
not be punished for those offenses in case they are committed
under the orders or sanction of their government or commanders"
93Ibid. pp. 365, 371, 376.
94Ibid. p. 328.
95Wright, The Legal Liability of the Kaiser, 13 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev.
124-125.
96Hearings, Senate For. Rel. Committee, p. 328.
97Ibid. p. 361.
98Ibid. p. 328.
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and American courts have held the defense good in military law.99
It is believed that article 228 of the peace treaty by which "The
German government recognizes the right of the Allied and Asso-
ciated Powers to bring before military tribunals persons accused
of having committed acts in violation of the laws and customs
of war," is a provision for carrying out established law, but that
the defense of superior orders should be admitted. By subsequent
arrangement it has been agreed that German courts rather than
allied shall exercise jurisdiction in these cases.
The writer concludes that the war has not destroyed the laws
of war and neutrality though it has modified some of their rules.
Probably the most important change is in those rules exempting
civilians from the rigors of war. In the future civilians will
probably be subject to more direct attack than in the past, not
because of the invention of long range military weapons for de-
stroying them, but because of the invention of political and tech-
nical methods whereby thieir state can more effectively coerce
them and their property to its service in time of emergency, thus
making such destruction of military utility to the enemy. In the
interest of the preservation of law, it can not be too much em-
phasized that while the rules of war and neutrality are founded
on a compromise of interests, yet when this compromise has
crystallized into law, temporary variations in the interests upon
which it is founded ought not to justify departure from its
terms, and will seldom render such a departure expedient in the
long run. While "necessity" should be a prime consideration in
framing rules, as a grounds for overriding established rules it
should be confined to the narrowest limits. Finally clear com-
prehension of the fact that the laws of war and neutrality
are sanctioned mainly by the self interest of belligerents, should
dispel an illusion that they can do much toward humanizing
war. These branches of international law have a value to the
general somewhat comparable to that of principles of tactics and
strategy. To the historian they furnish a useful standard whereby
the character of the peoples can be appraised. To the jurist they
are interesting as the supreme illustration of law without organ-
ization. Publicists, however, who wish their efforts to make to-
ward amelioration of the hardships of war, would better apply
themselves to the international law of peace and its enforcement.
99U. S. Rules of Land Warfare, 1914, art. 366; In Re Fair, 100 Fed.
149; 2 Willoughby, Constitutional Law, 1310.
